Since pooling of risk across populations with varying risk profiles lies at the heart of the concept of insurance, the issue of equity in paying for insurance is inevitable. The study of how to adjust for risk when comparing two groups of people has occupied actuaries for more than a century, and has been a topic of interest to health economists for several decades. As new tools for risk adjustment have evolved, the barriers to widespread adoption of these new tools themselves have become a source of research. Two papers in this issue are devoted to documenting the use of the latest risk adjustment methodologies (Keenan et al. 2001 ) and understanding why private employers have been so slow to adopt them (Ellis 2001).
Since pooling of risk across populations with varying risk profiles lies at the heart of the concept of insurance, the issue of equity in paying for insurance is inevitable. The study of how to adjust for risk when comparing two groups of people has occupied actuaries for more than a century, and has been a topic of interest to health economists for several decades. As new tools for risk adjustment have evolved, the barriers to widespread adoption of these new tools themselves have become a source of research. Two papers in this issue are devoted to documenting the use of the latest risk adjustment methodologies (Keenan et al. 2001 ) and understanding why private employers have been so slow to adopt them (Ellis 2001) .
The issue of how new risk adjustment methods are adopted in practice is an important one that certainly merits attention. However, to grasp this process of diffusion requires a better understanding of its context. What is the structure of the health insurance marketplace and what are its major segments? How do risk adjustment issues vary for these different segments? Since health insurance first was offered more than 70 years ago, what tools have been developed by the industry to adjust for risk, and how do the new risk adjustment methods compare to the more established techniques? In the interest of providing a framework for understanding how risk adjustment has been conducted in the commercial health insurance marketplace, I address these questions in this commentary. However, it first is essential to define the problem more precisely: Why worry about risk adjustment in the health insurance market?
The original purpose of insurance was to pool risk for catastrophic events. With an appropriately structured pool, the cost of participating in the pool (i.e., the insurance premium) is an acceptable price for protection against the risk of a high-cost, but low probability event. Health insurance started as protection against the high cost of hospitalization, but over time has evolved to include a wide range of benefits for more routine services. These services, such as preventive care, visits to the doctor, and outpatient diagnostic services, are very common, and most people will use them in the course of a year. Thus, health insurance has shifted from its original function and now blends two roles. First, it still has the catastrophic coverage feature which is very important to a few-the top 5% of the under-65 commercially insured population has average annual expenses of more than $17,000 per year, and accounts for more than 51% of total health care expenditures in the commercial population (Berk and Monheit 2001) . Second, health insurance has become a way to prepay routine health care expenses for the majority of the population, and for third-party payers such as the government and private employers a way to fund those expenditures for private individuals.
For both these categories, but particularly for the second, the amount and cost of services used by an individual are not a matter of chance, but rather are influenced strongly by predictable individual factors such as age, prior clinical history, and behavior. Given that likely expenditures vary somewhat predictably, the health insurance industry has faced the issue of how to adjust the amounts that participants in a shared risk pool should pay to maintain equity among players and ensure appropriate market dynamics. This issue has been the focus of attention by actuaries, state regulators, employers and health plans for decades. A wide range of tools has evolved to create risk adjustments based on demographics, regional variations in pricing and clinical practice, and variations in the specific experience of different populations. Advocates of other, new methods are focusing on one type of risk adjustment-the adjustment of premiums paid to health plans based on individuallevel diagnostic or demographic information-with a particular interest in the diagnosis-based tools that have been created in the last decade. Since most of these new tools classify individuals into different risk classes based on each person's type of medical problem, for simplicity I will refer to these tools as individual-based risk adjustment. These methods originally were developed for use in the public sector, particularly Medicare, but have not been embraced by other health insurance payers. Why not?
Risk Adjustment Issues for Major Market Segments
To understand the varying acceptance of individualbased risk adjustment, one first must understand that different segments of the health insurance market face very different types of risk adjustment problems. Consequently, these various market segments have developed different tools and approaches for dealing with those problems.
For this discussion, I will divide the health insurance market into the following three major segments.
Ⅺ Public payers. This includes the Medicaid and
Medicare programs, which have eligibility determined at the individual level, using explicit criteria based primarily on age and/or income. The risk pool for Medicaid is defined by states and for Medicare is nationwide. Ⅺ Large employer groups. The key characteristic of this market segment is that, for the most part, a given large employer group does not share risk with other players. It has opted out of the risk pool. As I discuss later, a variety of forces have encouraged employers with as few as 100 employees to move into this category. (The exact cut-off is somewhat arbitrary, but is not material to the discussion.) Ⅺ Small employer groups and individuals. This segment contains individuals and smaller employers who by their size have to participate in a risk pool with other employers or individuals. This segment represents the overwhelming majority of private employers offering insurance, per se, but a much smaller proportion of the total number of individuals with commercial insurance.
Often, there is a fourth category of medium-sized groups. However, this segment's risk issues are a blend of those found in the small and large group categories, so for simplicity I have collapsed the private employer market into only two categories instead of three. How are the risk adjustment issues different for these three market segments? I look at this question from the perspective of three public policy issues: first, access to insurance; second, the fragmentation of the risk pool and the corresponding population selection issues; and finally, the volatility of premium pricing and stability of the insurance market. The focus of risk adjustment methods often is confined to the second of these issues and, as we will see, broadening the set of issues raises other concerns that help explain why market segments respond differently.
Public Payers
For the public segment, access to insurance is not an issue. Once individuals meet the defined eligibility criteria, they are guaranteed the availability of health insurance. Similarly, since the pools are large, the impact of risk adjustments on average premiums is relatively modest (with the rank of premiums, from highest to lowest, differing by approximately a factor of two). Although modest, these variations are large enough to have discouraged health plans from participating in Medicare in some regions, so they clearly have had an effect. Yet, the variations in premium pricing have not threatened the viability of the public managed care programs as a whole. The major concern for this market segment is fragmentation of the large risk pools. The geographic spread of each public risk pool is quite broad, and the public programs have had major initiatives to create choice for eligible individuals by adding more health plans as options. Expanded choice has increased the exposure for biased selection of high-or low-risk individuals and created a major impetus for the new risk adjustment methodologies.
Large Group Market
The large group market segment shares some similarities with the public segment. Access to insurance for individual employees of large employers is the norm. Even though in theory offering health insurance is voluntary, as a practical matter nearly all large employers offer health insurance as a core employee benefit. Also, since the size of the population in each employer group is relatively large, variations in average cost per individual due to differences in the population's risk profile are modest. The premium differentials among types of employees tend to be less than 50%, certainly large enough to attract the attention of a human resource manager or chief financial officer, but not so large that they jeopardize offering health insurance.
The most significant difference between the public and large group segments of the health insurance market is that most large employers avoid fragmentation of the risk pool. The trend for large employers has been to provide a limited choice of offerings, but for those offerings to be administered by a single health plan in each geographic area where a firm has a large concentration of employees. National employers such as IBM or General Electric conduct intense regional competitions among health plans and reward the winners with all of their business in that area. Large regional and local employers similarly have moved to what are called ''replacement products''-strategies that place all of their eligible population into a single risk pool. Large employers still face the issue of identifying the more efficient options within these benefit programs and creating incentives for their employees to select those options. Risk adjustment is crucial in evaluating the relative performance of various options which may offer different benefit structures (health maintenance organization, point of service, preferred provider organization) or different networks. However, once a more efficient option has been identified, it is not clear that risk-adjusted premiums or employee contributions are the most appropriate or effective tools for encouraging individuals to choose that option.
Small Group Market
Small employers rarely offer more than one insurer, so fragmentation of the risk pool is not a concern for this market segment. Small employers often consider themselves fortunate to find a single health plan willing to offer them coverage. However, the small group/individual segment is the most troubled and fragile sector by far, and it faces other major issues driven by the potential failure of the risk pool. The specter of failure arises due to a number of factors: the volatility of premiums, the voluntary nature of groups offering health insurance, and the weak incentives for small employers with low-risk populations to offer health insurance.
The small group size means that the presence of one high-risk individual in a small group can increase the average expected costs by a factor of 10, or even more. Voluntary participation means that many small groups and individuals choose not to carry health insurance at all. With rising insurance costs, the participation percentage has been declining steadily. The conventional wisdom has been that low-risk small groups opt out, increasing the risk levels and thus the premium costs for those left in the pool; this leads to a death spiral which destroys the small group market. Health plans have tried to protect themselves from adverse selection in this market segment, creating a wide array of tools, such as underwriting guidelines and medical surveys, to screen small groups for risk. Without some form of regulatory intervention, most high-risk individuals or small groups seeking health insurance find that coverage is either priced prohibitively, or that they cannot get coverage at all. In the face of these dynamics, state insurance departments have struggled to find ways to maintain a viable market (Hall 2000 (Hall /2001 In some cases, states have tried to ensure access to insurance at a reasonable price by requiring that health plans offer coverage to any small group that requests it (guaranteed issue) and by regulating the variations in premiums. Other states have experimented with high-risk pools, placing the high-risk population in a separate market with much higher premiums and requiring all health plans to take their share. Independent of the approach used, when regulators succeed in creating access to insurance at a price that small groups can afford, they often verge on creating a market with such inherent losses that few commercial insurers are willing to participate.
The small group market reveals the inherent dilemma created by risk adjustment for insurance premiums. The purpose of insurance is to spread risk across a large number of participants in a pool. Risk adjustment attempts to redistribute the cost of participating in the pool back to the participants based on their level of risk, which tends to defeat the purpose of pooling risk in the first place. When the magnitude of risk adjustment is modest enough that it does not act as a barrier to participating in the pool, this conflict is manageable. However, when accurate risk adjustment in small groups results in unaffordable premiums, then the risk pool breaks down for the high-risk groups.
Comparison of Risk Adjustment Methods: Current vs. Individual Based
Since the problem of risk adjustment has existed for as long as insurance has been offered, how do employers and insurers currently try to deal with this issue? The more important alternative approaches are:
Ⅺ Self-insurance. This is the most common method used by large employers to avoid risk selection is-313 sues. By simply paying the actual medical costs for their employees in each year, an employer can eliminate risk selection issues entirely. Another benefit of self-insurance is that under guidelines of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), an employer also can avoid state-mandated benefits, and thus have much greater control over the scope of benefits offered. As state legislatures became increasingly aggressive in the 1990s and mandated a growing list of benefits, such as mental health parity and chiropractic coverage, they created a strong incentive for employers to drop out of the insurance pool. The insurance industry responded by designing ever more creative reinsurance tools that permitted employers with as few as 100 lives to self-insure without exposing themselves to unacceptable variations in cost. Ⅺ Actuarial adjustments. This is an important alternative to risk adjustment, yet one that appears to be poorly understood by many health service researchers. It uses historical data on costs and such risk factors as demographics, family size, and industrial class to project health expenses, set baseline premiums and adjust those premiums for risk. Ⅺ Experience rating. This sets premiums based on an employer group's prior year expenditures. For groups with more than about 2,000 lives, the reliability of each group's experience is ''credible.'' For smaller groups, the statistical basis for just using the group's data is not adequate, so its experience is blended with that of a broader pool (e.g., the overall community rate in the region). Ⅺ Community rating by class. This collects information on the age-sex profile of the employer and sometimes other risk factors, such as standard industrial class (SIC). It then applies weights that reflect the relative risks of the demographic classes to calculate a risk-adjusted premium. Community rating by class is a very common risk adjustment tool in the small group market. Ⅺ Underwriting guidelines. This approach tries to avoid circumstances that are likely to result in significant risk selection issues. For example, if the premium differential were too great for a plan with more comprehensive benefits, only people very likely to use the additional benefits would choose to pay the higher premium. Thus, underwriting guidelines would force the insurer to withdraw the more comprehensive plan. Ⅺ Replacement options. This approach may offer only one health plan, or multiple options under a single health plan. This is a very attractive strategy, both for employers that can reduce the administrative burdens of dealing with multiple health plans, and for health plans that can attract larger blocks of business under a single contract. Health plans have moved aggressively in the last 20 years to develop multiple product lines which can meet the needs of employers for this type of ''total replacement'' strategy.
The preceding list represents a wide spectrum of approaches that have been created to meet the needs of different segments of the health insurance market. In a nutshell, private employers believe they currently have methods that help them adjust for risk. Just as importantly, a powerful industry of benefit consultants and actuarial consulting firms are heavily invested in these tools. (After all, they invented them.) They are strategically positioned in the insurance industry as the paid technical advisers to private employers and regulators, and they will play a key role in any widespread change.
There is no question that the existing tools are imperfect and do not fully address the risk selection issue, as is readily seen from the persistent concerns about favorable selection for managed care plans. What are the prospects for individual risk assessment to be added to this spectrum? Risk adjustment at the individual level has had a controversial history, both in the efforts by researchers to invent better risk adjustment tools and by the public sector to implement them. The methodologies involved in individual risk adjustment are complex and dependent upon good data (Ellis 2001) . Part of the complexity comes from trying to create a typology for classifying individuals into medical categories such that each subgroup is relatively homogeneous and can be described by readily available claims data. Medical problems that are described by the same procedure codes can vary widely in their severity, and thus in the resources consumed. The specific data elements available from claims forms were designed for paying bills, not classifying risk, and have important limitations in their use as the basis of risk classification. It is a tribute to the creativity of the researchers involved that the risk adjustment field has evolved so rapidly over the last 10 years, in spite of these difficulties. However, a number of somewhat conflicting individual risk adjustment methods still are being debated by their advocates, and a clearly preferred approach has yet to emerge from the fray. Unfortunately, policymakers and businessmen who are the potential users of the tools are likely to believe in the old maxim that the presence of several conflicting solutions for a common problem is a sign that none is the right one.
Based on statistical analyses, individual risk adjustment in theory is better than traditional methods. However, the degree of improvement is modest, and confidence in the ability to actually achieve this improvement can be eroded by a variety of implementation issues. The experience of the public sector in using individual risk adjustment has not inspired confidence by other potential users. The demographicbased individual risk adjustment for Medicare, which was in place during the entire 1990s, was widely recognized as not being effective in addressing risk selection issues. The county-based average adjusted per capita cost (AAPCC) program has had a wide variety of problems and has created significant secondary effects in distorting the incentives for health plans. The diagnosis-based Medicare risk adjustment program that is just now being phased in to replace the AAPCC also is riddled with concerns over both the specific tools and the initial use only of inpatient data. The method has not yet been tested over time in large-scale applications and the jury is still out on whether it will result in a material improvement.
Conclusion
The adoption of individual-based risk adjustment has been slowed by a variety of barriers. The well-known problems of developing classification systems that reliably address severity and case-mix issues, and that span inpatient and outpatient settings, have made the methodologies complex and hard to understand by administrators. The reliance upon claims data, which originally were intended to pay for services, has provided a weak foundation for these new tools. The large financial stakes involved, along with the fragmentation of the commercial payer market, have heightened the normal resistance to change. In spite of these difficulties, the public sector has moved to adopt individual-based risk adjustment because its selection issues are much more intractable. Minimizing the distortions caused by risk selection is more critical for the public sector because it is structured quite differently from the private sector and faces different issues. In contrast, the large group market has been able to minimize the issues of adverse selection using other, more familiar tools. The small group market is plagued by other issues, most notably survival, and risk adjustment is the least of its concerns.
The task for advocates of individual risk adjustment is to make a persuasive case for private employers that the improvements offered by the new tools justify the effort and risk associated with making a change. An essential part of this process is developing a better understanding of: 1) the different needs of the various market segments; 2) the tools that have evolved to meet those needs; and 3) the role of benefits consultants and actuaries in supporting (or resisting) change in an industry that accounts for almost 15% of the gross domestic product. It is still relatively early in the life cycle of individual risk adjustment tools. More time is needed to refine them and to gain the necessary experience from early adopters to document their actual, as opposed to theoretical, performance. For these reasons, prospects are poor that there will be widespread adoption in the near future of individual-based risk adjustment tools by payers outside the public sector. These tools are more likely to have an important role in evaluation research, and possibly in adjusting payments to risksharing provider organizations, but that is a topic for another conference.
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